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OHIO RESIDENCY LAW FOR STUDENT VOTERS -
ITS IMPLICATIONS AND A PROPOSAL FOR
MORE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
RESIDENCY STATUTES
JONATHAN D. REIFF*
I. INTRODUCTIONO HIO STATUTES APPLYING a more stringent residency requirement to
students wishing to vote in their college town than that applied to
other people were held unconstitutional in Anderson v. Brown.' In Ohio
the case has resulted in virtual abandonment of residency tests for
students at the local level. The case was one of several nationwide that
had the effect of broadening residency requirements to include nearly
all college students, thereby vitiating the very purpose of residency re-
quirements.2 Theories have also been promulgated which would con-
clusively enfranchise students at their college addresses, although this
far exceeds the constitutional mandates of Anderson.3
Yet the underlying philosophical justification for residency re-
quirements is sound: the inhabitants of any given area should have the
right to govern that area without dilution of their votes by non-
residents. In fact, this tenet is constitutionally required by a system of
representative government, with the concurrent requirement of deter-
mining the residents of any particular political subdivision.'
The task is to evaluate the traditional common law tests of domicile,
many of which are outmoded, and to select those which are compatible
with the new constitutional requirements of real fairness and equality in
order to lay a firm foundation for the accomplishment of the original
purposes of residency law in the modern world. Furthermore, the
theoretical problems involved - constitutional exposition, common law
analysis, statutory construction, and governmental policy- need to be
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio; B.A.,
Harvard Univ.; J.D., Wake Forest College of Law.
332 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
See notes 111-26 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 80-81, 92-93 infra and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed
of Members chosen . .. by the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications for Electors of the most numerous
Branch of the State Legislature.") (emphasis added); id. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1 ("The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government .. ."); id. amend. XVIII, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each State.... The electors in each State shall
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislatures.") (emphasis added).
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synthesized into a system that is easily implemented by the Secretary
of State, easily applied by local boards of election, and finally, easily
understood by all new registrants for voting in Ohio. This article seeks
to solve these problems in the soundest possible manner as a guide to
the future and proposes a method of implementing them for boards of
election and the general public.
II. THE OHIO SITUATION
Anderson held unconstitutional former sections 3503.02(I) 5 and
3503.056 of the Ohio Revised Code, which had required students to
establish or acquire "a home for permanent residence" in their college
town in order to vote in local elections. Inasmuch as all other persons
needed only to establish residence' without necessarily acquiring a
home, the district court found that these statutory provisions violated
both the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and article V, section I of the Ohio Constitu-
tion.'
I [I]f any person attends any institution of learning, his residence and the
residence of his spouse, if any, shall be determined according to the
place where he resided prior to admission to such institution and not by
the place where he resides while attending such institution, unless such
person shall establish or acquire a home for permanent residence.
Act of May 24, 1957 § 1, 127 Ohio Laws 83, 84 (1957) (repealed 1971) (formerly
codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 3502.02(I)).
I If any person attends any institution of learning which is located in a
county other than the county in which the voting residence of such per-
son was located immediately preceding the time he commences to attend
such institution, and if such person while so attending such institution
resides in the county in which such institution is located, his voting
residence and the voting residence of his spouse, if any, shall be at that
location in the precinct in which it was located immediately preceding
the time he commenced attending such institution, and not by his place
of residence while attending such institution, unless such person shall
establish or acquire a home for permanent residence.
Act of May 24, 1957 § 1, 127 Ohio Laws 83, 84 (1957) (repealed 1971) (formerly
codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 3503.05)).
' Act of May 24, 1957 § 1, 127 Ohio Laws 83, 84 (1957) provided:
Every citizen of the United States who is of the age of twenty-one years
or over and who has been a resident of the state six months, of the county
thirty days, and the voting precinct thirty days next preceding the elec-
tion at which he offers to vote shall have the qualifications of an elector
and may vote at all elections.
This law has since been modified to change the age limit to eighteen years,
Act of Dec. 23, 1971 § 1, 134 Ohio Laws 879 (1975-76 Pt. I), and to reduce the
residency requirement to thirty days within the state, Act of June 6, 1975 § 1,
136 Ohio Laws 60 (1975). It is codified in its current form at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3503.01 (Page Supp. 1979).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Ohio
Constitution provided:
Every citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, who
[Vol. 28:449
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The practical result of Anderson has been to cause problems equally
unconstitutional as those which existed prior to that decision. County
boards of election have in many cases dispensed with attempting to
determine the residence of persons seeking to register, at least where
students are concerned.
The Anderson decision abolished specific student residency re-
quirements. Subsequently, the 1974 revision of section 3503.14 of the
Ohio Revised Code, which simplified the authorized voter registration
form, eliminated the discretion of local boards to include statements on
the registration form designed to inform the registrant of the meaning
of the legal residence with which he was certifying compliance.' The
change in the permissible content of voter registration forms seems to
have come about inadvertently in the course of simplifying previously
complex wording and, as far as can be determined, was not related to
Anderson. Its passage, however, has been interpreted by local boards as
preventing them from making the kind of inquiry necessary to deter-
shall have been a resident of the state six months next preceding the
election, and of the county township, or ward, in which he resides, such
time as may be provided by law, shall have the qualifications of an elec-
tor, and be entitled to vote at all elections."
OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (as amended Jan. 1, 1971). The twenty-sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution, effective July 5, 1971, changed the age require-
ment to eighteen years. The United States Supreme Court decision of Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), struck down state durational residency re-
quirements if they encompassed a period as long as several months. The relevant
language in the Ohio Constitution now provides:
Every citizen of the United States, of the age of eighteen years, who has
been a resident of the state, county, township, or ward, such time as may
be provided by law, and has been registered to vote for thirty days, has
the qualifications of an elector, and is entitled to vote at all elections.
OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (as amended Nov. 8, 1977).
1 Act of June 28, 1974 § 1, 135 Ohio Laws 784, 801 (1974) eliminated subsec-
tion (F) of section 3503.14 of the Ohio Revised Code which had read: "[Registra-
tion forms] may contain a space for . . . other information the board deems ad-
visable." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.14(F) (Page 1972) (repealed 1974). The
"other information" had previously been a statement such as that found on the
Voter Registration Form, Athens County, Ohio (1972) which read:
I consider the above address as my residence and the place where my
habitation is fixed and to which, when I am absent I have the intention
of returning El Yes El No
I have not come into this county for temporary purposes only, and I have
the intention of making this county my permanent place of
abode El Yes El No
This is the only voting address that I now assert El Yes El No
The 1974 version of section 3503.14 included a place for "home address" in the
prescribed registration form, whereas Act of May 27, 1977 § 1, [1977] Ohio Laws
5-43 (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.14B) (Page Supp, 1979))
substituted the word "residence" for "home address" but still without its legal
definition.
1979]
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mine actual residency of student registrants; in compliance with the
statute, they have stopped trying to do so.'"
Section 3503.14 of the code presently requires that voter registration
forms be "prescribed by the secretary of state" and that these forms in-
clude the following affidavit: "I declare under penalty of election
falsification that the statements herein contained [name, exact location
of residence, date and place of birth, citizenship status, address given
when last registered] are true to the best of my knowledge and belief;
and that I am legally qualified to vote."" There is included no certifica-
tion that the registrant's residence is the statutorily defined "residence
... in which his habitation is fixed and to which, whenever he is absent,
he has the intention of returning;"' 2 nor need the applicant certify that
he is not in the county "for temporary purposes only, without the inten-
tion of making such county his permanent place of abode."' 3 Thus the
registrant is required to certify compliance with stringent, specific
residency laws which are not suggested to him in the affidavit he must
sign.
It is difficult for a potential registrant to determine what re-
quirements he must fulfill in order to be considered a resident. The 1980
voter information pamphlet authorized by the Secretary of State does
contain an explanation in similar wording to the statute,' but there is
no requirement that the registrant read the pamphlet. The standard set
forth in the pamphlet that one merely "regard" the place as one's
residence is not adequate to suggest the concepts required by law for
legal residency. Even if the statute were fully recited in the registration
certificate, it would not help; the statutes contain words of art, and their
" See notes 24, 27-30 infra and accompanying text.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.14 (Page Supp. 1979).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02(A) (Page 1972). This section on rules for
determining residence provides in part:
All registrars and judges of elections, in determining the residence of a
person offering to register or vote, shall be governed by the following
rules: (A) That place shall be considered the residence of a person in
which his habitation is fixed and to which, whenever he is absent, he has
the intention of returning.
Id.
1 Id. § 3503.02(C).
" A. J. CELEBREZZE, JR., 1980 [Ohio] VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET:
How is residence determined?
* By law your residence is the place to which, whenever you are
absent, you have the intention of returning. Leaving for temporary
purposes, such as military service or school attendance, need not re-
sult in a change of residence for voting purposes.
Can a student vote from his school address?
* Yes, if he regards that place as his residence. Otherwise, he must
vote in his home community.
[Vol. 28:449
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meaning, which in residency law is critical, is not discernible to the
layman. While the oversimplification of the pamphlet might be an im-
provement, such oversimplification unconsciously contributes to the
near uniform public interpretation that residency means nothing more
than living locally, regardless of the registrant's particular cir-
cumstances."5
The result of this failure to enforce the residency requirement for stu-
dent voters is typified by the situation in Athens, Ohio, home of Ohio
University, which has a population 16,500 without students. In the 1972
general election, approximately 4,837" of the 16,110 students at Ohio
University declared "under penalty of election falsification"' 7 that they
"5 This misinformation has spread to the point that well-meaning civic and
political organizations may unwittingly promote improper registration while at-
tempting to "get out the vote." See, e.g., ATHENS COUNTY DEMOCRATIC Ex-
ECUTIVE COMMITTEE, REGISTER AND VOTE IN ATHENS COUNTY (1976): "How to
Register to Vote in Athens County: It's simple. You can register to vote if you: ...
3. Have resided in Athens County for 30 days by November 2." There is no in-
dication that "legal residence" is involved. This is not to suggest that students
would vote illegally if they were properly informed. See, e.g., letter from Paul
Cali to Board of Elections, Silver Springs, Maryland (March 2, 1977) (on file with
the author):
During October 1975, I was encouraged to register to vote here in
Athens, and was told that all I had to worry about was if I would be liv-
ing here for at least three months to be able to vote legally. What these
people neglected to inform me was that by registering to vote in Ohio I
was automatically claiming residence here, for more than just voting
privileges, and giving up my residence status in Maryland. A few days
ago, I was informed by an Athens policeman that I was driving on dead
tags and a dead license because they were from Maryland, and I should
have an Ohio driver's license and Ohio tags. Had I known I would lose
my Maryland residence, I never would have registered to vote here.
1 The author compared the 1968 general election figures (supplied by Board
of Elections, Athens County, Ohio) with those of the 1972 general election, the
first presidential election after the passage of the twenty-sixth amendment
lowering the voting age to 18. Athens County, with a population essentially static
during this period, showed an increase of 4,944 voters. Of this, exactly 4,900 were
in Athens City where Ohio University is located. Although precinct lines were
redrawn, gains or losses in nonstudent areas approximately cancel each other
out, clearly indicating that the increase from 425 votes to 3,214 votes in four of
the five wards containing student dormitories or apartment complexes was the
result of the student participation. There was virtually no residential construc-
tion in these wards from 1968-72. Students, however, are spread in lesser
numbers over many other city wards, accounting for most of the overall increase
of 2,122 in these other areas. The Office of the Provost, Ohio University, reported
that during this period, the faculty increased by 42 persons not formely living in
Athens. Assuming that 75% of these new faculty and their spouses voted, there
could be included in the 4,900 city increase 63 faculty family voters. Thus, by
deducting an optimistic figure for the only other possible increase in voting in
1972, that of an increased number of faculty, we are left with a conservative
figure of 4,837 student voters.
'" Election Registration Form, Athens County, Ohio (1972).
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were not in the county "for temporary purposes only"'" and that they in-
tended to make Athens County their "permanent place of abode."'9 Thus
those voting amounted to 30.02%2 of the then-enrolled student body;
upon graduation, however, less than one half of one percent remained in
Athens.2 ' Those students who had declared themselves permanent
residents and voted, however, accounted for 50.9% of the votes cast in
Athens City and 22.4% of the votes cast in Athens County."
In addition, boards of elections have been rendered much less power-
ful in their ability to adequately inform the public and enforce the
residency laws. For example, prior to the 1976 general election in
Athens, the student newspaper ran an article stating "[a]ll students
coming to the University this September will be eligible to register in
Athens County, according to [the Director] . . . of the Board of
Elections."" This is an accurate statement of the law, but while it is in-
tended to mean that students may become residents despite their status
as students, it is too often understood by the public as a blanket state-
ment of eligibility. To compound the problem, those persons responsible
for registering voters are not instructed to inquire into the residency
status of registrants beyond the basics; ie., the listed local address on
"8 See Onlo REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02(C) (Page 1972).
'" Id (by reverse implication).
20 In fall, 1972, 4,837 voters out of 16,110 full-time students reported as
registered by the Ohio University Office of the Registrar.
" Interview with Edward R. Beckett, Placement Office, Ohio University, in
Athens, Ohio (Aug. 2, 1979). Of the 16,110 full-time students registered in fall,
1972, 80 would be a very generous approximation of those who remained as com-
munity residents upon graduation; of those 80, probably more than half were
original community residents who moved into family enterprises and thus are not
within the context of this analysis. In fact, while 30.0 2 % declared themselves
residents in order to vote, only 7.68/0 listed an Athens City address as their ad-
dress in the 1972-73 university telephone directory (1,435 out of approximately
17,365 nonforeign entries). Informal declarations such as these are particularly
weighty as opposed to formal declarations designed to achieve a purpose.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 20, Special Note on Evidence for
Establishment of a Domicile of Choice (1971). Simply referring to the domicile of
origin as 'home' will carry little weight when facts show abandonment and ac-
quisition of a new domicile. See a g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Lyons
v. Egan, 110 Colo. 227, 132 P.2d 794 (1942); In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151,
163 A. 303 (1932).
2 Votes cast, 1972, Athens City, 9,509; Athens County, 21,588. Athens County
Board of Elections, Athens, Ohio. The 4,837 student votes are 50.9/ and 22.4%
of these figures respectively. Even these percentages are conservative estimates
because the assumption made here is that all students live in the city and only
the city increase represents increased student voting. In reality, a number of
students live out of the city and thus increased county voting numbers; similarly,
the entire increase in faculty was deducted from the city voting increase whereas
a number of faculty also live out of town. Student votes therefore probably repre-
sent a slightly higher percentage in both the city and the county.
" The Post, Sept. 17, 1976, at 1, col. 5-6.
[Vol. 28:449
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the registration form and the certification thereon stating that the
registrant is "legally qualified to vote." 4
This abandonment of any attempt to apply the residency law to stu-
dent voters has serious implications. It directly conflicts with the Ohio
statutory requirement that "[ejach board of elections shall . . . in-
vestigate and determine the residence qualifications of electors ...""
under the penalty of fine or imprisonment or both.2" The problem is not
that election officials are oblivious to their statutory duties; rather, they
may be hesitant to carry them out because under Ohio law election of-
ficials must pay their own legal fees if they are sued for alleged
wrongful refusal to register a potential candidate.
During the 1972 general election, a potential registrant in Athens
County refused to answer the questions on the current duly-authorized
registration form. After she was refused registration, she sued the two
members of the board of elections who had denied her registration and
the Secretary of State, who had backed the denial." While the Attorney
General's office defended the Secretary of State, the board members had
to pay between $1,800 and $1,900 each for their legal defenses before
the case was dismissed as moot.2' Although the Ohio Attorney General
has ruled that Ohio Revised Code section 3501.17 permits a county
board of commissioners to procure insurance to protect members of the
board of elections from liability arising from the exercise of their official
duties,' suits against officials in their private capacity seem to have
" An inquiry by the author at one of the special student registration locations
as to whether residency was required and how it was determined elicited this
response: "We aren't supposed to look into that." Volunteer Registration Official,
Baker Center, Ohio University, Oct. 4, 1976. Election officials confirm this prac-
tice. Interview with W. Howe, Director, Athens County Board of Elections, in
Athens, Ohio (Sept. 27, 1979) (Ohio University); Interview with H.E. Holdsworth,
Director, Franklin County Board of Elections, in Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 7, 1979)
(Ohio State University, Capital University and others); Interview with M.
O'Hare, Director, Licking County Board of Elections, in Newark, Ohio, Sept. 14,
1979 (Denison University).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.11(Q) (Page Supp. 1979).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.16 (Page 1972) provides that: "No member,
clerk, or employee of a board of elections shall: (A) Willfully or negligently violate
or neglect to perform any duty imposed upon him by law.. ." on pain of a fine of
"not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars" or imprisonment
"not less than one nor more than five years" or both. It is further provided in sec-
tion 3599.17 that "[n]o registrar or judge or clerk of elections [shall].. . fail to per-
form any duty imposed by law. Whoever violates this section shall be fined not
less than twenty-five nor more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more
than fifteen days or both." Id. § 3599.17.
' Peck v. Brown, No. 73-433 (S.D. Ohio, filed Jan. 14, 1974).
8 Interview with E. Robe, Member, Athens County Board of Elections, in
Athens, Ohio (Mar. 11, 1980).
29 1978 OHIo ATT'Y GEN. Op. 064. It remains within the sound discretion of the
board of county commissioners to determine whether such insurance "is a
'necessary and proper' expense of the board of elections." Id
19791
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ended any attempt by them to exercise their statutory authority.0
These officials may be open toliability from another direction. In Lloyd
v. Babb3 a suit was brought against members of a North Carolina county
board of elections by registered voters charging "(1) a failure ... to per-
form their statutory duties by failing to determine whether persons
were residents of Orange County before allowing them to register to
vote there, and (2) abuse by these officials of whatever discretion the
election statutes permit by their failure even to inquire whether per-
sons were residents of Orange County before allowing them to register
to vote there."32 The court held that "on remand if evidence adduced at
trial shows that the members and officials of the Orange County Board
have failed to require students seeking to register to vote to prove their
domicile to be in Orange County, the court may enjoin them from fur-
ther registering students without doing so."33 There is no reason to
believe that Ohio practices are not subject to similar attack.
Because the legal definitions of the words "domicile" and "residence"
are not self-explanatory to the non-lawyer but do encompass a very
precise legal connotation, students themselves may be shocked to find
they have unwittingly changed a legal status that goes beyond the
scope of where they may vote and may subject them to consequences
which they do not intend.34 Before discussing the specific holding and im-
31 The election officials mentioned in note 24 supra stated that volunteer
registrars are given no further instruction in residency than that contained in
Form No. 10-G, "Duties of Volunteer Registrars," Nov. 1978, issued by the
Secretary of State for certification that the volunteer deputy registrars know
their duties. The form has no description of residency and only an obscure hint
that the signers thereof must read the statutes themselves. Thus much of the
current registration procedure, especially where students are concerned, is in the
hands of persons who have no inkling of what residency is and a feeling that it is
their civic duty to register every person they find living locally.
31 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979).
32 Id at 421-22, 251 S.E.2d at 848.
Id. at 451-52, 251 S.E.2d at 865. The applicable North Carolina statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-274(10) (1976), provides that it is unlawful:
For any chairman of a county board of elections or other returning of-
ficer to fail or neglect, willfully or of malice, to perform any duty, act,
matter or thing required or directed in the time, manner and form in
which said duty, matter or thing is required to be performed in relation
to any primary, general or special election and the returns thereof;...
Compare the North Carolina statute with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.16 (Page
1972): "No member, clerk, or employee of a board of elections shall... [w]illfully
or negligently violate or neglect to perform any duty imposed upon him by law,
or willfully perform or neglect to perform it in such a way as to hinder the ob-
jects of the law . . ." (emphasis added).
' See, e.g., letter from Paul Cali, supra note 15. See also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3599.11(A) (Page Supp. 1979) ("No person shall knowingly register or
make application or attempt to register in a precinct in which he is not a qualified
voter. . . .Whoever violates this division is guilty of a felony of the fourth
degree."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.12 (Page 1972) ("No person shall vote or
[Vol. 28:449
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pact of Anderson on Ohio statutory law and its application to student
voters, it is necessary to briefly review the common law of residence
and domicile.
III. THE LAW OF DOMICILE
It should be noted at the outset that "'[r]esidence' is the favorite term
employed by the American legislator to express the connection between
person and place, its exact meaning being left to construction, to be
determined from the context of the apparent object to be obtained by
the enactment." 5 It is not unusual, therefore, to see decisions which
discuss "residence" in fairly narrow terms of physical presence within a
community, with nothing more required than the intent to remain there
for the time being." It is clear, however, that residency law for the pur-
poses of voting is the common law of domicile.
While domicile is very much a term of art, it may typically be described
as
[t]hat place where a man has his true, fixed and permanent home
and principal establishment and to which whenever he is absent,
he has the intention of returning .... That place in which a man
has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for
a mere special or temporary purpose but with the intention of
making a permanent home for an unlimited period.37
Domicile "implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence
as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the ut-
attempt to vote in any . . .election in a precinct in which he is not a legally
qualified voter.... Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than fifty
nor more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not less than one nor more
than five years, or both."). While these provisions have not been enforced against
students, the potential is there.
' In re Sheard, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 259, 260, 163 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Juv. Ct. 1959). See
also, e.g., District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941); Weible v. United
States, 244 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1957); Hughes v. Illinois Pub. Aid Comm'n, 2 Ill. 2d
374, 118 N.E.2d 14 (1954).
' See, e.g., Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952) (the term "resident
within" as used in the Trading With The Enemy Act implies something more
than mere physical presence and something less than domicile); Owens v. Hunt-
ling, 115 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1940) (Oregon statute providing that the militia shall
consist of United States male citizens "resident within the state" held applicable
to students present in Oregon to attend school but domiciled in Washington);
Gallagher v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 219 Md. 192, 148 A.2d 390 (1959)
(requirement that governor "reside" at seat of government does not require him
to abandon a former legal residence and acquire a new one).
"' In re Paich's Estate, 90 Ohio L. Abs. 470, 473, 186 N.E.2d 755, 757 (8th Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). See also Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914); Codagnone v.
Perrin, 351 F. Supp. 1126 (D.R.I. 1972); Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal.
App. 2d 278, 41 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1964); State v. Benny, 20 N.J. 238, 119 A.2d 155
(1955).
1979]
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most significance,"' and while a person may have several residences, he
may only have one domicile at any given time.39 It is these concepts
which are clearly and concisely reflected in the Ohio Revised Code sec-
tions dealing with qualifications as an elector.0
This body of common law developed in an era in which people infre-
quently moved from one location to another. Transportation was poorly
developed and travel was dangerous; the economy was basically
agrarian and static. Most importantly, the family economic unit provided
sustenance and social security in times of hardship as well as the eventual
place of retirement. Almost everyone would return to this original home
when the reason for the absence was over. The notion arose that one
was legally identified with his place of birth and did not lose this
domicile until he took affirmative steps to establish a new one, thus pro-
tecting one's legal base of identification and security from loss through
inadvertence.41 Part of the problem in handling the subject of voter
residency is that criteria, once useful in ascertaining a person's domicile,
have become outmoded by changes in modern life and when applied no
longer accurately accomplish their original purpose.
Ownership of property and payment of real estate taxes may con-
stitute significant evidence of domicile when one is inhabiting the prop-
erty in question as a personal dwelling." Lessees, however, also pay
property taxes in the form of higher rents. Some of these people may be
domiciliaries of the locale, others mere transients. Thus when evidence
of domicile is being applied to qualifications as an elector, the United
States Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment to deny the franchise to those
otherwise qualified to vote because they do not pay tax on real prop-
erty.'3 Likewise, payments of state and local income taxes on income
' Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
' See, e.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914); Mitchell v. Kinney, 242
Ala. 196, 5 So. 2d 788 (1942); Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955).
40 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02 (Page 1972).
" At common law military service, attendance at an educational institution
located elsewhere, and compulsory confinement in a penal institution were
recognized as situations where absence from one's home might be prolonged but
which would not occasion loss of domicile. See, e.g., Turner v. Kelley, 411 F.
Supp. 1331 (D. Kan. 1976) (inmate of penal institution); Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Lewis, 306 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Ala. 1969) (serviceman). See also Note,
Domicile as Affected by Compulsion, 13 U. PITT. L. REV. 697 (1952).
"2 See, e.g., Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1915); Gardner v. Gardner, 118
Utah 496, 222 P.2d 1055 (1950); Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 458 Pa. 147, 329 A.2d
483 (1974).
,1 Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute
requiring a majority of votes cast by property owners in order to pass a general
bond issue); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (holding un-
constitutional an Arizona law permitting only real property taxpayers to vote at
an election on the issuance of general obligation bonds for municipal im-
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earned in a municipality, gasoline taxes, sales taxes and use taxes are
made by residents and transients alike and are not helpful indicia of
domicile."
Other physical manifestations traditionally supportive of domicile
assume a less persuasive role today. Location of a church membership
may once have been important, 5 but it can be argued that the church
now occupies a less central role as a social institution and that many
memberships are moved only as an afterthought. While a bank account
may be indicative of permanent settlement in a locale, 6 many accounts
are not transfered because of investment or business considerations,4 7
and one may open an account for convenience and check-cashing pur-
poses in a location where he intends to remain temporarily."8 Being sub-
ject to local laws49 and the jurisdiction of local courts 5 are not relevant
factors inasmuch as all persons within a jurisdiction are equally subject
to its laws and such jurisdiction is often gained due to the location of the
provements); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (holding unconstitu-
tional a Louisiana law permitting only real property taxpayers to vote on
revenue bonds issued by a municipal utility system); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a New York law permit-
ting only people who owned or leased property in the district or parents with
children in schools to vote in school district elections). But see Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding a Califor-
nia statute restricting franchise to landowners in water storage district
elections). For a discussion of the analysis applied when property ownership is
sought to be used as a tool of disenfranchisement, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 763-65 (1978).
" But see Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971). Michigan
law provided a rebate of one-eighth of the sales tax revenue to counties and cities
on a per capita basis and a rebate of 20/o of gasoline tax revenue on a combined
population/highway mileage basis. The Michigan Supreme Court found that in-
asmuch as students were counted as residents for these purposes, the factors
were to be considered in a determination of domicile. Id. at 689, 189 N.W.2d at
431.
" See, e.g., Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1915) (evidence that plaintiff had
transferred church membership from Michigan to Connecticut was a factor in
establishing that plaintiff was domiciled in Connecticut for purposes of diversity).
48 See Teague v. District Ct. for Salt Lake County, 4 Utah 2d 147, 289 P.2d
331 (1955) (accumulation of bank accounts was a factor in ascertaining whether a
soldier stationed in Utah was a resident of the state). See also, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 20, at 82 (1971).
'7 See, e.g., Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 458 Pa. 147, 329 A.2d 483 (1974).
,8 Cf. Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (holding of local
checking or savings accounts were among factors considered by county commis-
sioners in determining residency and right to vote of college students).
4" But see id. at 1304 (indicating that being subject to local laws is a relevant
factor in establishing residence and right to vote of college students).
I But see Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d
233 (1972) (indicating that being subject to local laws and local court jurisdiction
are relevant factors in establishing resident students' right to register to vote).
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person, res or act regardless of domicile. However, failure to locally
register a motor vehicle and obtain a new driver's license within a cer-
tain period of acquiring a new residence may be strong evidence against
acquisition of a new domicile." This is because a person failing to do so
is claiming an exemption from the laws of his new state based on citizen-
ship in another state.
While the foregoing types of evidence are still the key to determining
domicile,52 the light in which they are evaluated has shifted somewhat.
It has always been the law that a person does not lose one domicile until
he acquires a new one53 and a new one can be acquired only when it is ac-
companied by an intent to live in that location, even if only indefinitely.'
This "non-loss" aspect of domicile was formerly the primary center of
focus, and one had to prove acquisition of a new domicile by a cumula-
tion of factors showing, by inference, an abandonment of the old one.
Such an evidentary focus led to the rather facile conclusion that certain
factors, alone or in combination, were "requirements" for domicile,5"
although this was never the case. The new trend is to look for the
absence of real ties to the old domicile as an indication that domicile
may have changed, since it may be easier to ascertain abandonment
"' See, e.g., Dyer v. Huff, 382 F. Supp. 1313 (D.S.C. 1973); McCoy v. McLeroy,
348 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 nn.6-8 (M.D. Ga. 1972); Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp.
1111, 1115 (D. Vt. 1971). See also Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308, 314 (D.
Kan. 1974).
Ohio law also requires all vehicle owners to register their vehicles in the
district "in which the owner[s] reside," OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4503.10(c)(2) (Page
1972). Nonresidents are excepted. Id § 4503.37. Only nonresidents may use an
out-of-state driver's license. Id § 4507.04. A new resident must procure a new
driver's license and a new car registration within a reasonable time of the new
resident's arrival in the state, a reasonable time being presumptively 30 days.
Telephone interview with G. Stephen Jupinko, Legal Counsel, Ohio Department
of Highway Safety (Jan. 7, 1977).
' "The objective is to determine the place which is the center of the in-
dividual's life now, the locus of his primary concern." Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348
F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
' See, e.g., Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1962); In re Estate of McCal-
mont, 16 Ill. App. 2d 246, 148 N.E.2d 23 (1958); Wiseman v. Wiseman, 216 Tenn.
702, 393 S.W.2d 892 (1965). But see Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 dd-1 (1976) (providing that Americans abroad do retain, for
voting purposes, that residence which they last held in the United States despite
the fact they have fully abandoned it for a permanent residence outside the coun-
try).
I See, e.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914); Sivalls v. United
States, 205 F.2d 444 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 898 (1953); Gallagher v.
Philadelphia Trans. Co., 185 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1950); Appleton v. Southern Trust
Co., 244 Ky. 453, 51 S.W.2d 447 (1932).
55 Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 708 (1970). See,
e.g., Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
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than acquisition. 51 Of course, acquisition must be proved17 because non-
loss is still the law. 58 When abandonment is clear, it becomes easier to
qualify whatever ties have been established by this particular person to
his new community to prove his residence there.
59
1 "To establish domicil it is only necessary to show that one's former domicil
has been abandoned and that there exists no intention of returning to it." Bright
v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527, 534 (E.D. Ky. 1971). See also Ramey v. Rockfeller,
348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
17 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19, comment c
(1971), which states: "The burden of proof is on the party who asserts that a
change of domicil has taken place."
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02(B) (Page 1972), which provides: "A
person shall not be considered to have lost his residence who leaves his home and
goes into another state or county of this state, for temporary purposes only, with
the intention of returning." See also A.J. CELEBREZZE, JR., supra note 14.
1 A collateral subject requires some mention here. Although the United
States Supreme Court has held that durational residency requirements of several
months unconstitutionally abridge the right to travel, Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975), it has reaffirmed the proposition that a state or municipality may limit the
franchise to bona fide residents. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972). A
requirement that a person may not vote unless he has been a resident for 30
days, as is found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.01 (Page Supp. 1979), is permissi-
ble, however, because it serves the state's "important interest in accurate voting
lists." Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973). Strictly speaking, residence is
acquired instantaneously upon the concurrence of the requisite intent and
physical presence. Therefore the durational residency requirement is not a
residence requirement at all but an administrative device helpful in the iden-
tification of bona fide residents.
While the Dunn Court doubted the effectiveness of long durational residency
requirements in preventing voter fraud, 405 U.S. at 346, there is no doubt that
actual fraud continues to exist where, for example, suburban residents wish to
vote in a city election. R. SMOLKA, ELECTION DAY REGISTRATION 8 (1977). More
serious in light of an abbreviated durational residency requirement is the number
of illegal votes cast by nonresidents, many of whom may vote in the wrong
precinct and most of whom may be unaware of their illegal act. These totals can
be substantial: in the November, 1976 elections, 1.8% of all election day
registrants in Bloomington, Minnesota and 4% of the same in Minneapolis voted
in the wrong precinct. Id. at 25-26.
Many elections, especially on the local level, are very close, and contests
decided by less than a hundred votes are common. See Frakes v. Farragut Com-
munity School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 121 N.W.2d 636 (1960); OHIO DEP'T OF STATE,
PRACTICAL POLITICS 5-6 (no date); R. SMOLKA, supra this note, at 29. Our casual
national attitude towards election propriety means that when there is a crush at
the polls during instant registration, it is not unusual for officials to just "herd
'em on through," regardless of registration propriety or even identification, id. at
28, and there is rarely effective followup on alleged improprieties. Id. at 46-49,
57-61.
When there is an extremely close election, as where Albert Wheeler won the
mayoral election of Ann Arbor, Michigan, by one vote in April, 1977, prior ac-
curate determination of residency is critical. Twenty nonresidents were
discovered to have voted in that election, 17 of whom voted accidentally, and the
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that these 17 nonresidents could not be compelled
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Insofar as unemancipated persons (traditionally minors) are concerned,
they were unable at common law to choose their own domicile and were
considered to have the domicile of the custodial parent.' Because,
historically, mobility was so limited and ties to one's home were strong,
the concept that students were mere "visitors" at their school location
was in fact a reflection of reality. "Non-loss" statutes"1 and conclusive
presumptions such as those struck down in Anderson v. Brown"2 arose
to codify the retention of domicile during the absence of a student from
his home. With the lowering of the voting age to eighteen, however, and
the ascendancy of voting to the status of a primary constitutional right,
courts have held that a minor must be permitted to choose his voting
residence according to the same standards of domicile that are applied
to others. 3 Thus unemancipated students are now free to choose a
residence for voting regardless of other state laws concerning their
dependent status." With the exception of those attending community
colleges, most students retain their temporary status much as they did
when the common law was developing. 5 The reality of their conduct is
consistent with the reality of their actual intentions: students do not go
to college with the intent of settling in the college community unless
they have been residents of that community. They go for the temporary
purpose of education, and then they leave. While there, they do not in
fact establish the kind of "permanent" residence the law requires, and,
as a consequence, in large numbers of cases they are not eligible to vote.
IV. CHANGES IN RESIDENCY LAW ACCOMMODATING STUDENT VOTERS
Three factors caused the twentieth century crisis over student
voting. First, mobility of labor has created an increasingly mobile
population in which frequent moves by families are common.6 Given this
type of social mobility, requiring an intention to reside permanently, or
even indefinitely, would disenfranchise vast numbers of fully employed,
to disclose how they voted in the absence of fraudulent intent. Belcher v. Mayor
of the City of Ann Arbor, 402 Mich. 132, 262 N.W.2d 1 (1978). Thus it is unknown
whom the validly registered voters of Ann Arbor elected. Prior accurate
registration and determination of residency would have prevented this situation.
' See, e.g., Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Yale v. West
Middle School Dist., 59 Conn. 489, 22 A. 295 (1890).
61 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3503.02(A), (B), (G) (Page 1972).
2 332 F. Supp. 1195 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
See, e.g., Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1971).
See, e.g., Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308, 314 (D. Kan. 1974);
Shivelhood v. Davis, 336 F. Supp. 1111, 1115 (D. Vt. 1971); Hershkoff v. Board of
Registrars, 366 Mass. 570, 321 N.E.2d 656, 663-64 (1974).
' See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
See Singer, supra note 55, at 710-12. See also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE-
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY: 1974, Annual Housing
Survey, Series No. H-150-74 Pt. D (1974).
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self-supporting, taxpaying citizens. 7 The conscious-future-intention
aspect of the law has therefore been allowed to atrophy, and more em-
phasis has been placed on looking for the center of gravity of a self-
supporting life. 8 Second, the voting age for state and local elections was
lowered to eighteen by the twenty-sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution, 9 thereby allowing what had been a moot issue to
surface in the hands of many new college-age voters. Third, the concepts
of "equal protection" and "equal opportunity" took on a new and compel-
ling force during the 1960s"0 so that the obviously unequal treatment of
students was ripe for correction by the resulting establishment of new,
fair laws of residency applicable to everybody equally.
Faced with the pressure for equal treatment and the intense interest
in public policy characterized by the early 1970s, a number of courts and
some legislatures moved to enfranchise student voters by changing the
universally recognized criteria for domicile. Accommodation of a special
group allows the original purposes of a residency law to be easily
defeated, but that consequence was unfortunately overlooked in the
rush to remedy the very real inequities of the day.
Some jurisdictions seem to have reduced state residency re-
quirements to mere presence, using as justification a number of reasons
not properly criteria for domicile." Others establish ephemeral criteria
which often are not criteria at all but simply justifications for granting
residency." These new criteria are applied across the board and fail to
make a distinction between temporary inhabitants and the bona fide
" Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Newburger v.
Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559, 563 (D.N.H. 1972).
See, e.g., Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 12 (1971).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1; see note 8 supra.
70 For discussions of the expansion of these concepts during that decade, see
Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Karst &
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey- A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,
1967 SuP. CT. REV. 39.
71 "If they physically live in [the town where the university is located], are in-
terested in the community, are anxious to vote there and nowhere else, and in-
tend it as their legal residence, then there is no justifiable reason why they
should not be allowed to vote." Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (M.D. Pa.
1972). Accord, Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d
233 (1972).
72 "[Tjhey are required and expected to obey all local laws and ordinances and
to submit to the governance of the duly elected local officials and it is understand-
able why they seek a voice in the community .. " Sloane v. Smith, 351 F. Supp.
1299, 1304 (M.D. Pa. 1972). Accord, Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d
423 (1971); Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233
(1972).
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residents" who have the exclusive right to govern their political unit. In
effect, these cases abandon domicile as traditionally conceived, but do
not deal with the consequent inability to identify the bona fide
residents." Under the expanded criteria, the seasonal tourists in a
resort town, the newly arrived Army division, or the students at the col-
lege could register and vote on local issues if they were American
citizens over the age of eighteen and had lived within the district for a
minimal time period.15 There appears to be no requirement that these
" See, e.g., Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 689, 189 N.W.2d 423, 431-32
("Students pay State income tax, city income tax (if any), gasoline, sales and use
taxes .... Students with children can and do enroll them in the public school
system .... ); Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 325, 294
A.2d 233, 244 (1972) ("[Students] deal with the local courts and local governmental
bodies ....").
" Similar problems will occur in states which have changed the requirements
for residency for voting from traditional domicile to some new formula. The
Michigan statute defines residence as "that place at which a person habitually
sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects and has a regular place of lodging.
Should a person have more than 1 residence ... that place at which such person
resides the greater part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the
purposes of this act." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.11(a) (West Supp. 1979-80).
This may be appropriate for those attending college in Michigan, but it disenfran-
chises college students originally resident in Michigan and who consider
themselves Michigan residents who attend college out of state, inasmuch as
almost all other states require bona fide residence according to the common law
of domicile and this provision eliminates the non-loss concept. It thus creates ex-
actly the problem raised by Singer, supra note 55, wherein students have lost
their domiciles at home but have not gained ones elsewhere. Furthermore, this
"greater part of the time" test will need a whole new body of law to deal with
people who are mobile the greater part of the time, a problem easily solved by
the traditional non-loss feature of domicile. Note the dilemma of Michigan's
elected representatives in Washington who would appear not to be Michigan
residents under this law.
Iowa has changed the requirements for voting from domicile to "the place
which [the elector] declares is his home .... " IOWA CODE ANN. § 47.4(4) (West
Supp. 1979-80). The Iowa courts have defined "home" as "one's principal place of
residence" and "where a person dwells and which is the center of his domestic,
social and civil life." Paulson v. Forest City Community School Dist., 238 N.W.2d
344, 349 (Iowa 1976). The problem is that unless one's declaration as "home" is
conclusive, and Paulson states that it is not, 238 N.W.2d at 348, challenges must
be adjudicated by reference to indicia which prove intent like those of domicile.
Intent is still a qualification under the statute. IOWA CODE ANN. § 47.4(4) (West
Supp. 1979-80). Thus it seems impossible to avoid the issues basic to the common
law of domicile where one's intent to abandon a former domicile and establish a
new one must be proved by an examination of actions and ties to the new com-
munity.
' See, e.g., Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 350, 294
A.2d 233, 928 (1972) (Weintraub, J., concurring). This new position is far in excess
of that which is constitutionally required. States can limit the franchise to actual
state citizens (domiciliaries), as can local political units. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-92 (1966); Carr-
ington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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persons have some relationship to the locality which would justify their
taking part in its governance rather than that of some other locality.
While this may seem just and fair to temporary students, it does not
solve the problem. The underlying tension still remains over the con-
cept that there should be a relationship between those voting and those
who will remain to pay for an adopted tax levy or do without services
because the levy was defeated, for example.7 ' The often voiced fears
that the local Army post or local college will "take over" are undoubtedly
overblown in actuality, 7 but the potential is there. To return to the
Athens, Ohio example, while less than one-half of one percent of the
students at Ohio University in the fall of 1972 remained upon gradua-
tion, the 30.02% who declared themselves permanent residents and
voted accounted for 50.9% of the votes cast in Athens City and 22.4% of
the votes cast in Athens Countys.7 Whatever else one may say, one can-
not dispute the fact that very substantial numbers of voters who were
in reality temporary substantially affected the issues under considera-
tion."
V. RATIONALE FOR ENFRANCHISING STUDENTS IN THEIR
COLLEGE TOWNS
It has been argued that students should be given the right to vote in
their college communities regardless of their actual legal residence. One
commentator has reasoned that because students may not intend to
return to their family homes after graduation, they can no more honestly
sign an affidavit of intent to return there and stay permanently or in-
definitely than they can in their college towns."0 Since this absence of
76 See, e.g., Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Paulson v. Forest City Community School Dist., 238 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1976);
Frakes v. Farragut Community School Dist., 255 Iowa 88, 121 N.W.2d 636 (1963).
See Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233
(1972) for a thorough discussion of this issue. Even if new residents might "take
over," it is constitutionally impermissible to "fence them out" as long as they are
bona fide residents. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965). The real ques-
tion is whether large, newly arrived groups of people might include substantial
numbers of persons who are not actually bona fide residents and whose influence
would therefore dilute the votes of the bona fide residents, both old and new.
78 See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
Many of these issues were significant. November, 1972 general election
issues included two local mental health levies and a school tax levy, which got
their highest consistent favorable vote percentage in student wards housing
significant numbers of persons who did not remain to pay the taxes they voted.
See notes 20-21 supra. On the state level, repeal of the state income tax was
defeated, again with comparatively high votes against repeal in the student
wards. Athens County Board of Elections, Athens, Ohio. Of course a full slate of
county and city officers was also elected, considerably changing the political com-
plexion of the city government.
" Singer, supra note 55, at 713-14.
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future intent in effect disenfranchises students at both locations, it is
urged that permitting registration in the college town more accurately
reflects the interests of the students during that period of their lives.
This argument misconstrues two points by over-valuing conscious in-
tent. First, a person does not lose his domicile in his hometown merely
by intending to settle elsewhere; he loses it only upon the acquisition of
a new domicile. Such acquisition is a combination of physical presence
and a "legal intent" to make it one's home "for the time at least." This
legal intent may be conscious or unconscious, but it is reflected by a per-
son's moving the important activities of a self-sustaining daily life to the
new residence and the concurrent relinquishment of such ties to the
old.8' Courts have consistently held that a mere declaration that one con-
siders himself domiciled in a given location is insufficient when external
evidence clearly shows that his life is in fact focused elsewhere. 2 Thus,
if a person moves all the incidents of his self-sustaining life to a new
location where he intends to remain temporarily before returning to his
previous home, he may nonetheless become domiciled there because
that is the location from which he is in fact carrying on his life. On the
other hand, an individual may transfer some indications of residency to
a new location and declare that to be his home, yet fail to convince a
court that it is his domicile because there is sufficient evidence that his
life remains centered in the old location. Consequently a student who
has not established a new legal residence in his college town is not
precluded from exercising his right to vote in his "home town" even if
he does not with certainty intend to return there.
The other misconstruction inherent in this argument results from a
literal reading of the terms "permanent" or "indefinite," which are used
in most statutes as a description of one's intention to remain in a new
location and without which one is merely temporary andcannot become
a resident.83 These words were taken literally for years and used to
disenfranchise students. But their meanings have changed-they are
words of art, and, properly used, "permanent" and "indefinite" are
universally construed in accordance with the Restatement of Conflicts
81 See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text. See also the excellent treat-
ment of this whole area in Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600,
187 S.E.2d 52 (1972), as modified in Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843
(1979). For historical perspective on the topic, see Hogan, Joseph Story's Essay
on "Domicil", 35 B.U. L. REV. 215 (1955).
See, e.g., Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 425 (1939) ("While one's statements
may supply evidence of the intention requisite to establish domicile at a given
place of residence, they cannot supply the fact of residence there.... [T]he actual
fact as to the place of residence and [one's] real attitude and intention with
respect to it as disclosed by his entire course of conduct are the controlling fac-
tors in ascertaining his domicile."). Accord, District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314
U.S. 441, 456 (1941).
' See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3503.02(C), (F) (Page 1972).
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to mean "for the time at least" and are "not to be taken literally."8'
Thus, a person may establish a residence if he knows he will leave or
even plans to leave. Were this not so, huge numbers of mobile
Americans who fully intend to go where job opportunities take them
would be consistently disenfranchised.8 5 Therefore, a student can ac-
quire a domicile despite his lack of intention to remain in Ohio per-
manently. This modern construction is easily applied to Ohio Revised
Code section 3503.02(C)," which otherwise prohibits acquisition of a new
domicile unless the move is "permanent," and to section 3503.02(B),
which conditions non-loss on an intent to return.
8 7
A second argument for presumptively considering students residents
of the locale where they attend school is premised on the manner in
which they are enumerated for census purposes. Consistent with the un-
challenged ascendancy of non-loss and other residency provisions ap-
plicable to students at the time, prior to 1950 the Census Bureau
counted students at their parents' addresses.8 After considerable study
in that year, the bureau decided to count students where they were pre-
sent, ie., at their college or school addresses. 9 This action was signifi-
cant for purposes of apportionment of congressional districts, since the
United States Constitution requires congressional apportionment to be
determined by the census.9" The inference has been made that since
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18, Comment c (1971). Ac-
cord, Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308 (D. Kan. 1974); Ramey v. Rockefeller,
348 F. Supp. 780 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars, 366 Mass. 570,
321 N.E.2d 656 (1974); Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979), modify-
ing Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972).
Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559, 563 (D.N.H. 1972); Ramey v.
Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
W OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.02(C) (Page 1972) provides: "A person shall not
be considered to have gained a residence in any county of this state into which he
comes for temporary purposes only, without the intention of making such county
his permanent place of abode."
Id. § 3503.02(B) provides: "A person shall not be considered to have lost his
residence who leaves his home and goes into another state or county of this state,
for temporary purposes only, with the intention of returning." (Emphasis added).
Note, Student Voting and Apportionment: The 'Rotten Boroughs" of
Academia, 81 YALE L.J. 35 (1971) (providing a thorough analysis of this argu-
ment).
" The change was made because many college students were not being in-
cluded on their parents' census forms and the method used for fixing "other
groups in society with two 'homes"' for census purposes was "the place in which
they generally eat, sleep and work .... " Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449
F.2d 575, 578-79 (3d Cir. 1971). The change does not reflect any attempt to ascer-
tain domicile. Census standards represent a "photographic picture" of the loca-
tion of the population taken within a relatively narrow frame of time. Thus, while
college students should be counted in this manner, no inference should be drawn
as to their actual domicile.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 provides: "Representatives shall be apportioned
among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
1979]
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students are represented where they attend school, they should be con-
clusively presumed to be able to vote there and nowhere else.9 This
reasoning has been widely cited to justify granting students domicile at
their college addresses. 2
The political repercussions of this change have been significant.
Counting students wholesale at their university addresses can make a
change in the number of congressional seats allotted to states with large
migrations of students.9" Further, most states, including Ohio, apportion
internally according to these same census figures,9' producing com-
paratively greater internal overrepresentations by counties and
municipalities with resident colleges and gross local distortions, as
students are counted for local apportionment in wards which sometimes
have no other population at all. While it may be constitutionally per-
missible to so count college students locally, it is not required. However,
to conclude that they are conclusively residents because they are so
counted is a non sequitur.
The argument for granting domicile to students at their college
residences because of census procedures has two flaws. First, it is as
constitutionally impermissible to conclusively enfranchise students at
school, and conversely disenfranchise them at their original homes, as it
was to previously conclusively disenfranchise them at school. 5 An in-
dividual determination must be made concerning voting residence
regardless of what is done for apportionment. This point, in all its
simplicity, is the end-all of the matter. One cannot assert a constitu-
tional right to individual determination in one case and preclude such a
determination in another.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Borough of Bethel Park v.
Stans,9" concluded that being counted by the census in no way predeter-
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed." Id. art. I, §
2 further provides: "The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years of
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subse-
quent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they by Law direct."
' Note, supra note 88, at 35.
92 E.g., Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1972); Worden v.
Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233 (1972); see Sloane v.
Smith, 351 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Pa. 1972). Cf Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 421
(1970) (persons living in a federal enclave geographically located within State of
Maryland, who are residents of Maryland for purposes of census, cannot be
denied right to vote by State of Maryland).
" Note, supra note 88, at 48-49.
' See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 2 ("The apportionment of this state for
members of the general assembly shall be made in the following manner: The
whole population of the state, as determined by the federal decennial
census ....").
" Anderson v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (S.D. Ohio 1971) states that
"[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires ... that the same test be applied to all
alike, students or no." (Emphasis in original).
" 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971).
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mines a person's domicile. Because of the enormity of the task of
enumeration, the Congress, and the Census Bureau through the Depart-
ment of Commerce, are constitutionally empowered to adopt certain ad-
ministrative oversimplifications which "determine the 'whole number of
persons in each State' at a particular moment every ten years. 9 Census
methods "necessitate the use of a definite, accurate and verifiable stan-
dard""8 which is a one-date fix on the population, broadened to include
those persons "who are temporarily absent for days or weeks from such
usual place of abode [the place in which they generally eat, sleep and
work]."" The count includes persons "who have no usual place of
residence,"'' ° thus demonstrating that no inference as to domicile is in-
tended from the fact that a person is counted in a specific place. In fact,
the Census Bureau specifically disclaims any inference from its count as
to the domicile of any particular person.'"' The Third Circuit summarized
its position as follows: "Nor is our view [that the census bureau method
of counting is constitutional for purposes of congressional apportion-
ment] altered by the fact that a college student may be designated by
the state of his parental home as a resident or domiciliary and permit-
ted to register there for voting purposes.""' 2
Counting a student for congressional apportionment one place accord-
ing to census criteria is constitutionally correct despite the fact that he
may be required to vote elsewhere. Neither situation relates to or con-
trols the other, and in 1973 the United States Supreme Court confirmed
this position as the correct view. In Gaffney v. Cummings,'3 the Court
dealt with the issue of whether the mathematical equivalency required
by the Constitution for congressional apportionment is to be followed as
precisely for intrastate legislative apportionment. In holding that there
were allowable intrastate deviations from the exactitude required for
federal apportionment, the Court examined the nature of the census. To
illustrate that even exacting compliance with census figures will not
produce the equality of a person's vote, the Court said:
The United States census .. . measures population at only a
single instant in time .... [If it is the weight of a person's vote
that matters, total population-even if stable and accurately
taken -may not actually reflect that body of voters whose votes
Id. at 580.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 578.
100 Id
"' "In determining residence, the Bureau of Census counts each person as an
inhabitant of a usual place of residence (i.e., the place where one usually eats and
sleeps). While this place is not necessarily a person's legal residence or voting
residence, the use of these different bases of classification should produce the
same results in the vast majority of cases." U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979 at 3 (100th ed. 1979).
102 449 F.2d at 580.
'0 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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must be counted and weighed for the purposes of reapportion-
ment, because "census persons" are not voters .... The propor-
tion of the census population too young to vote or disqualified by
alienage or non-residence varies substantially. . .. [Above
enumerated] figures tell us nothing of the other ineligibles mak-
ing up substantially equal census populations among election
districts: aliens, non-resident military personnel, nonresident
students, for example."
A second flaw in the notion that students should be enfranchised at
the location where they are counted for congressional apportionment is
found in the Supreme Court holding that "the Equal Protection Clause
does not require the States to use total population figures derived from
the federal census as the standard by which this substantial population
equivalency is to be measured.""'' In fact, for purposes of internal appor-
tionment, a state may exclude persons who are counted as part of the
federal census but who are not residents, as long as it is done by a
statewide actual census to determine real residency."'
VI. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF STUDENT VOTERS
It is now important to consider recent cases nationwide to discover
where on the spectrum Anderson v. Brown most appropriately fits. It is
unquestionably proper for states to establish residence requirements
for voting."7 Indeed, it is mandatory as long as senators and con-
gressmen are elected by states and as long as local representation
within states remains."' Anderson held quite simply that "[tihe Equal
Protection Clause requires. . . that the same test be applied to all alike,
students, or no . . . . [This conclusion] require[s] . . . in respect of the
'residence' determination of the Board [for students], the exact same
tests uniformly applied by the Board to non-students . . . .""' But does
" Id. at 746-47. Thus, despite the fact that voting weight equality cannot be
produced by adherence to the census, the deviation is not enough to destroy the
constitutional mandate to do it in that manner for congressional apportionment.
Similarly, the nonvoting students counted by the census in Borough of Bethel
Park were not considered sufficient in number to invalidate congressional appor-
tionment based on census figures including them.
05 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966).
".. Winter v. Docking, 373 F. Supp. 308 (D. Kan. 1974) (approving state plan re-
quiring census takers to use, for basis of enumeration, the same criteria utilized
in determining voting residence). Accord, Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 661,
312 N.E.2d 208 (1974); In re Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 146, 276 A.2d 825
(1971); Marks v. Township Committee of the Township of New Hanover, 124 N.J.
Super. 504, 308 A.2d 24 (1973).
107 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419, 422 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91, 96 (1965); Ramey v.
Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 786-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
"0 See notes 111-26 infra and accompanying text.
"09 Anderson v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (emphasis in
original).
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this mean that a state may not vary its inquiry as the circumstances of a
particular person appear, as long as it seeks to reach the truth of his
residence as measured by one single standard? While courts have
employed differing analyses in resolving this issue, all would agree that
"[niothing may be presumed or implied from the fact that a registrant is
a student." '
One line of cases holds that registration officials must ask the exact
same questions of all applicants, regardless of any apparent differences
in their living situations. Yet neither Bright v. Baesler"' nor Sloane v.
Smith,"2 the two cases most representative of this position, seeks to
dilute the authority of states to determine actual residence" 3 nor to
weaken the substantive requirements of residence in their particular
states."' In fact, Bright suggests modern, precise questions which would
110 Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527, 534 (E.D. Ky. 1971). Accord, Whatley v.
Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973); Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843
(1979), modifying Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52
(1972). The reason for a person's sojourn in the community is the one factor which
must remain moot or practically so, else the reality of our transient population's
moving on would act as a powerful bar to the acquisition of residence by the
members of numerous professions compared to which students are actually much
more stable. But cf. Dane v. Board of Registrars, 371 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1978)
(the reason for inmates of prisons being in the locality is significant because it in-
volves loss of ability to choose that location, whereas job location or schooling do
not). Today even members of the military, except for first term draftees, are con-
sidered to be in their location voluntarily, a change in the common law. See
Newburger v. Peterson, 344 F. Supp. 559, 563 (D.N.H. 1972).
..I 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
112 351 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
H "The defendants may ask each applicant a series of questions directed at
proving domicil, but each applicant should be asked the same questions, and the
questions should reasonably relate to proof of domicil." Bright, 336 F. Supp. at
534. "It cannot be disputed that a State has the power to require that voters be
bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivisions and an appropriately
defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be
necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community, and
therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny." Sloane, 351 F. Supp. at
1303. Where it appears that a registrar is using a unique form which is applied
only to students, the Secretary of State, under emergency statutory authority,
has power to prohibit use of such a form. United States v. Texas, 445 F. Supp.
1245, 1259 (S.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd mem. sub nom. Symm v. United States, 439 U.S
1105 (1979).
114 Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971) can be ap-
propriately categorized with Sloane and Bright for the purposes of this analysis,
but it represents a different factual situation. The Michigan statute defined
residence for voting purposes as,
that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal
effects and has a regular place of lodging. Should a person have more
than 1 residence ... that place at which such person resides the greater
part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of
this act.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.11 (West Supp. 1979-80). This standard is much dif-
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actually elicit more clearly the true intention of the registrant concern-
ing his domicile." 5 Neither represents the almost total abandonment in
Ohio of the attempt to determine student residence that has followed
Anderson.
Another line of cases may be characterized as more traditional than
Anderson and is best typified by Palla v. Suffolk County Board of Elec-
tions."' New York state's voter registration statute, originally enacted
in 1846, identified certain classes of persons whose location in the state
might well be transient. But the statute did not establish a presumption
of nonresidency; indeed, it was specifically neutral:
For the purpose of registering and voting no person shall be
deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his
presence or absence while employed in the service of the United
States . . .nor while a student of any institution of learning
[within or without the state] nor while kept at any welfare in-
stitution .... "I
Any person falling within such a classification was required to file cer-
tain statements designed to elicit his actual domicile. The statute was
attacked as a denial of equal protection because it provided for inquiry
which was different from and additional to that made of all other classes
of citizens.
Rather than requiring that the "exact same test" be applied to all
voters, as was done in Anderson,"8 the New York Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in Palla found that
[the statute] requires that students along with other transients
point to facts extrinsic of their residence at an institution in sup-
port of their declarations of domicile, but that requirement is
consonant with the natural inference that their stay is for
limited purposes only. The classification itself represents no
more than a reasonable effort at assuring that applicants for the
vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence....",
The court recognized that as a practical matter, "[tjhe issue ultimately
must be resolved with respect to each individual applicant on the facts
ferent than traditional domicile, but its substance is not in issue. The Wilkins
court merely seeks to apply it to all people equally: "No special questions, forms,
identification, etc., may be required of students." 385 Mich. at 694, 189 N.W.2d at
434.
" 336 F. Supp. at 534.
31 N.Y.2d 36, 286 N.E.2d 247, 334 N.Y.S.2d, 860 (1972).
"7 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 151(a) (McKinney 1964) (current version codified at N.Y.
ELEC. LAWS § 5-104(1) (McKinney 1978)).
". 332 F. Supp. at 1197.
" 31 N.Y.2d at 50, 286 N.E.2d at 254, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.
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peculiar to his or her case tending to establish the college community as
an adopted home." 2
Other courts following this analysis have held that the "natural in-
ference that [a college student's] stay is for limited purposes only" may
provoke further inquiry but may not be of substantive weight in the
determination of residency 1 ' and that "[ilt is not a violation of equal pro-
tection to select for individual inquiry categories of citizens presenting
the most obvious problems ... as long as the ultimate standard is the
same for all, as it is here. '
Why have these two lines of cases developed? It is submitted that the
former cases can best be explained as an example of the simple, time-
honored effort of jurists to arrive at the truth by drawing up a better,
clearer, more definitive set of forms or definitions and then administer-
ing them without deviation. This solution is adopted when invidious,
capricious abuse of discretion appears, as it had in Bright and Sloane.
The contrary view is that no perfectly drawn instruments take care of
all situations but have their own brand of error built in. Courts follow-
ing this approach find that what is needed, therefore, is the discretion to
search after the subjective truth, guided by, but not limited to, the use
of carefully stated ultimate objectives, procedural guidelines and ex-
amples. The second group of cases, typified by Palla, takes this ap-
proach, allowing discretion; actually, the common statutory definitions
of domicile, like those in Ohio, are the carefully drawn, all-encompassing
definitions sought by the courts in Sloane and Bright. They have,
however, become words of art to such an extent that new developments
in both social mobility and constitutional perspective have rendered
them practically useless and thus have led to their abandonment.
The points worth noting are that students may be identified, as may
120 Id. at 48-49, 286 N.E.2d at 253, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 868. Accord, Hall v. Wake
County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972).
121 Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 420, 442-43, 251 S.E.2d 843, 847, 860 (1979). The
inference may not rise to the level of a rebuttable presumption against residency
of the identified group. Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527, 533-34 (E.D. Ky. 1971);
Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971). Of course, a statutory
rebuttable presumption against residency is impermissible. Whatley v. Clark, 482
F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. White v. Whatley, 415
U.S. 934 (1974) (overruling by implication Wilson v. Symm, 341 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.
Tex. 1972)). Even the inescapable presumption of the retention of a former
domicile, which is necessary in order to prevent domicile of a temporarily absent
person from being lost if he leaves but has not established a new domicile, is ap-
parently unable to be used as a rebuttable presumption against acquisition of a
new domicile when the issue of a new domicile comes up for adjudication. Its use
is limited to supporting the "inference" in question here which then leads to an
appropriately thorough inquiry. Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843
(1979).
22 Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (a case which
was deferred until the decision in Palla had been rendered). Accord, Ballas v.
Symm, 494 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Dane v. Board of Registrars, 371
N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. 1978).
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other categories of persons, "consonant with the natural inference that
their stay is for limited purposes only." '123 Then appropriate questions
may be asked in order to apply the single constitutionally required stan-
dard. As the United States District Court for South Carolina, affirmed
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, stated, "[t]he [Elections] Board
would be derelict in its duty to blindly accept a statement of residency
by each applicant. There is nothing wrong with or even suspect in
registration officials asking college boarding students, whose perma-
nent addresses are outside the county, certain questions to determine
residency and their qualifications." '124 In this line of cases the courts are
simply permitting adequate inquiry into the truth of the registrant's
domicile. To apply the "exact same tests,"2 5 were it defined as forbid-
ding any further inquiry as a person's situation might warrant, would
prohibit registrars and courts from fulfilling their statutory duty to
discover the truth.
126
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the purpose of voter residency requirements is to determine
residency-in-fact, it is submitted that the mandate given to Ohio boards
of election by Anderson v. Brown should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the body of case law exemplified by Palla. It is one
thing, however, to propose a new test and quite another to implement it
in a manner that is fully in accord with statutory law, convenient for
boards of elections, and easily understood by registrants.
The author proposes that an "Explanation to Registrants"" be
printed in a short pamphlet which would be handed or mailed to first-
time registrants.128 The registrant could then make an informed decision
123 Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36, 50, 286 N.E.2d 247,
254, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 870 (1972).
"2 Dyer v. Huff, 382 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d
1397 (4th Cir. 1974). Accord, McCoy v. McLeroy, 348 F. Supp. 1034, 1039 (M.D.
Ga. 1972); Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars, 366 Mass. 570, 321 N.E.2d 656 (1974);
Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979).
12 Anderson v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
12 See Dane v. Board of Registrars, 371 N.E.2d 1358, 1368-69 (Mass. 1978).
1 See Appendix, infra page 476.
12 This would be particularly valuable where a potential registrant requests
registration forms by telephone or by mail as is provided by statute, O0IO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3503.11(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1979), since he could read it prior to mak-
ing a decision to register. It would also be very helpful where an individual other
than one employed by a board of election is empowered to register persons for
voting. See, e.g., id. § 3503.11(D) (empowering registrar of motor vehicles to
register for the vote those applying for an Ohio driver's license). This is not too
great a burden to insure that registrants are guided in making the correct deci-
sion and that a complex constitutional problem with potentially significant
political ramifications is forestalled.
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for himself. By statute'" local boards of elections have the authority to
initiate this practice on their own, and certainly a specific reference to it
by the Secretary of State would aid in the matter. The pamphlet brings
the reality of registrants' situations into clear focus by giving typical ex-
amples at each end of the scale. Registrants may then compare the
situations to their own to decide whether they are within or without the
limits. They thus take the responsibility upon themselves should they
violate the law. Further challenge or inquiry is left to the discretion of
local boards as directed or guided by the statutes of the state of Ohio
and the Secretary of State.
" Id. § 3501.11(E) gives local boards authority to "[m]ake and issue such rules
and instructions, not inconsistent with law or the rules established by the
secretary of state, as it considers necessary for the guidance of election officers
and voters .... " A local board's authority to distribute exactly this type of infor-
mation on residency has been confirmed specifically. Telephone interview with
James R. Marsh, Assistant Secretary of State, State of Ohio (Aug. 4, 1976). In
fact, such a pamphlet is currently in use in Delaware. DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD
OF ELECTIONS, RULES FOR DETERMINING RESIDENCY (1979). Prepared initially by
the League of Women Voters, the two page handout has been adopted for
general use, as revised, by the board. It is well received by all and in particular
enhances the seriousness with which students undertake registration. Interview
with D. Woldorf, Director, Delaware County Board of Elections in Delaware,
Ohio (Sept. 7, 1979) (Ohio Wesleyan University).
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APPENDIX
EXPLANATION TO REGISTRANTS
This is an informal supplement to the current Ohio Voter Information
Pamphlet explaining the requirements for voting. It is provided by your
board of elections under the authority of Ohio Revised Code section
3501.11(E) and is not legal advice. You are likely to find that you are
clearly eligible or clearly ineligible. If you have questions, you should
consult an election official or an attorney.
I. Under Ohio Revised Code section 3503.01, to vote in Ohio, you must
be
A. a United States citizen
B. 18 years of age or older by election day
C. a resident of the state for 30 days by election day and a resident
of the county and precinct in which you wish to vote. You must also
register to vote not less than 30 days prior to the election.
II. You must be a resident as defined in section 3503.02 of the Ohio
Revised Code. Residency for the purposes of voting is sometimes called
"domicile" and involves more than just living here. It may be explained
as follows:
Every person gets a legal residence, or domicile, when he is born. It is
the residence of his parents or legal guardian and is usually that place
where they live. When they move, the child's residence moves with
them until he moves out and becomes self-supporting.
You do not lose your last legal residence until you establish a new
one. You may be away from your domicile to be in the military, to at-
tend school, or to work or live abroad for a long time and still be entitled
to vote there. You lose your legal residence only when you establish a
new one, which implies that you have abandoned your old one. If you are
over 18, you are free to choose a new residence for voting purposes even
if you are not self-supporting but meet all other requirements.
III. To establish a new legal residence, you must intend to abandon
your previous one and establish a new one; you must be present
physically in the new place.
Once you have moved into this county, you must ask yourself: Am I
here for a temporary purpose only, and do I want to retain my previous
legal residence even though I do not necessarily intend to return to it?
Or do I want to have this county as my "permanent place of abode"-my
real home or "legal" residence? In this situation, when the law says
"permanent" it means "at least for now."
You cannot have two legal residences; you must abandon the former
to establish a new one here. You must abandon the daily and monthly
relationships which are part of running a self-sufficient daily life. Your
conduct will prove this abandonment of one residence and the establish-
ment of a new one. The required evidence is a showing that your main,
permanent (for now) self-sufficient headquarters are here.
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THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES CAN HELP YOU DETERMINE
YOUR LEGAL RESIDENCE
I. A single nurse moves here for her first job from another county in
Ohio. She rents an apartment and moves in her clothes. She opens a
local checking account and, when the time comes, registers her car here.
She leaves seldom-used personal possessions at her parents' home and
maintains a church membership and a savings account in that town. Her
driver's license was issued there, and she visits there on some holidays.
When asked if she intends to make this county her "permanent place of
abode," she says that she doesn't know; it depends on whether her con-
tract is renewed.
THIS PERSON IS A RESIDENT AND CAN VOTE AFTER SHE
HAS BEEN HERE 30 DAYS. Why?
A. Has she established all the important items of a self-sustaining
daily life here? YES. She lives here and has a self-supporting job
here. All the possessions that she needs and uses are here. She has a
checking account and a check-cashing privileges here. Her car is
registered here.
B. Does she intend to have her home here? YES. She does not
return to her former town anytime she is not working. For now, this is
the place that she intends as her residence.
C. Has she abandoned her former residence? YES. She does not
intend to return there to live, at least for now. Those possessions she
has left behind are "in storage" and are not important for carrying on
her daily life. She is inactive in her church except when visiting her
parents and maintains her savings account only as an investment. Her
Ohio driver's license is irrelevant because the law does not require it to
be changed prior to its expiration date.
NOTE: Even if she were on welfare and living in a hotel, she would
establish a legal residence if she had moved her possessions here and in-
tended this to be her "home" for now.
II. A single student moves here from out of state to attend a university.
He lives in a dormitory or furnished apartment and has many of his
clothes and other possessions with him. He opens a local checking ac-
count and works part-time to help with expenses. On the other hand, he
must pay out-of-state tuition, and he does not change his car registration
and driver's license from his hometown. During vacations he does not
remain in his college town, and after graduation he intends to go where
he can get the best job. He has never thought about where he wants his
legal residence to be.
THIS PERSON IS TREATED JUST THE SAME AS THE NURSE
AND MAY BE QUALIFIED TO VOTE HERE. HE MUST MEET THE
SAME STANDARDS ALTHOUGH THE ANSWER MAY NOT BE AS
CLEAR.
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A. Has he established all the important items of a daily self-sustain-
ing life here? If he keeps many clothes and possessions at his former
home and returns to pick them up frequently, he may not have moved
his "life support system" here. The fact that he is not self-supporting is
NOT a consideration, and neither is the fact that he must pay out-of-
state tuition. On the other hand, his failure to change his car registra-
tion and driver's license to Ohio is a strong factor against voting here
because he is asserting freedom not to comply with Ohio law because of
residency in another state.
B. Does he intend his college town to be his home? This may be evi-
denced by declarations of "home address" on school records, loan ap-
plications, driver's license and income tax forms. He will be absolutely
disqualified from getting legal residency here if he votes at his former
residence or if he is the recipient of a scholarship issued only to residents
of another state.
C. Has he abandoned his former residence? Does he live there when
school is not in session or does he visit only during some vacations? If he
maintains a year-round dwelling and stays here after school is out and
during some vacations, he probably has moved here and abandoned his
former residence. If he maintains his college dwelling only during the
academic year and returns to a former home almost immediately when
school is out, he probably has not abandoned the former residence. It
would seem that his purpose for being here is only to attend school while
it is in session; since his stay is temporary, he is disqualified from voting
by Ohio Revised Code section 3503.02(C).
III. Two students, formerly not residents, get married and move into
an apartment. Their parents continue to support them so they can finish
school. Previously each voted in the locale where their parents reside,
and they specifically intend to leave this place after graduation for
wherever the opportunities are better. They visit one set of parents and
then the other during most vacations.
These people are residents and can register and vote. The Ohio Revised
Code, section 3503.02(D) provides that the place where the family of a
married man or woman resides shall be considered his or her place of
residence because they abandoned their residences with their parents
when they set up a household for themselves. They are not married
"temporarily," since they have a household, their life support system is
here. If they have out-of-state license plates and driver's licenses, they
will be in violation of Ohio law since they are now residents of Ohio. If
they vote elsewhere, they will violate the election laws there since they
are Ohio residents.
NOTE: Under Ohio Revised Code section 3503.02(D), married persons
living apart can have separate domiciles.
FINAL NOTE: IF YOU WISH FURTHER EXPLANATION, YOU
[Vol. 28:449
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MAY WISH TO LOOK AT TITLE 35 OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE,
WHICH CONTAINS THE ELECTION LAWS, OR TO CONSULT AN
ELECTION OFFICIAL OR AN ATTORNEY.
A comprehensive discussion on which this pamphlet is based may be
found in Reiff, Ohio Residency Law, CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW,
volume 28, page 449 (1979).
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